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Abstract—We propose and analyze a day-ahead reserve market
model that handles bids from flexible loads. This pool market
model takes into account the fact that a load modulation in one
direction must usually be compensated later by a modulation of
the same magnitude in the opposite direction. Our analysis takes
into account the gaming possibilities of producers and retailers,
controlling load flexibility, in the day-ahead energy and reserve
markets, and in imbalance settlement. This analysis is carried
out by an agent-based approach where, for every round, each
actor uses linear programs to maximize its profit according to
forecasts of the prices. The procurement of a reserve is assumed
to be determined, for each period, as a fixed percentage of the
total consumption cleared in the energy market for the same
period. The results show that the provision of reserves by flexible
loads has a negligible impact on the energy market prices but
markedly decreases the cost of reserve procurement. However,
as the rate of flexible loads increases, the system operator has
to rely more and more on non-contracted reserves, which may
cancel out the benefits made in the procurement of reserves.
Index Terms—Market design, reserve market, energy market,
load flexibility, demand-side management, agent-based model.
I. INTRODUCTION
With the rapid development of renewable energy, the differ-
ent actors in the electrical power sector are increasingly trying
to exploit load flexibility. For example, many retailers are in
the process of developing the required infrastructure, either
directly or through a separate entity called an aggregator, for
moving consumption to periods of the day for which the price
of electricity is low. Another example is the case of System
Operators (SOs) that are increasingly trying to attract flexible
loads to their market for ancillary services, by allowing, for
example, loads at the distribution level to take part in it.
Many authors have studied the effects of load flexibility in
the electricity and reserve market on the payoffs to different
actors in the electrical system [1–3]. In [1], demand is rep-
resented by constant elasticity curves independent from one
market period to another. The results show that demand-side
reserve provision leads to lower operating costs. Reference [2]
proposes a market model where the demand-side is directly
controlled so as to shift consumption and provide upward
and downward reserves. They also conclude that demand-
side reserve offers can lead to significant gains in economic
efficiency. Load reduction periods are typically followed by
load recovery periods [3]. This observation leads the author
to conclude that first, the demand-side should not be seen as
a pure alternative to the provision of reserves, and second,
the participation of demand-side resources could increase the
overall required levels of reserve. Nevertheless the fact that
the system operator can exploit demand flexibility can reduce
operating costs. These results are based on globally optimized
systems and do not capture gaming possibilities coming from
the individual optimization of each actor.
This paper aims to capture these gaming possibilities in
an agent-based model. First, we model the behavior of the
actors (producers and retailers acting on load flexibility) of the
electricity market and the market mechanisms governed by the
system operator. Afterwards, the models are used to simulate
the electrical market system. Finally, the trajectories of the
system are analyzed so as to provide answers concerning the
properties of the electricity market. This paper is a first step
towards answering questions such as the following. How is
the money paid for reserve procurement affected by allowing
more flexible loads to participate in the reserve market? How
would it affect energy market prices? How would a retailer
behave when it could exploit its load flexibility both in the
energy market and the reserve market?
Agent-based modeling has been extensively applied to elec-
tricity markets [4]. The review [5] concludes that most models
represent the demand side as a fixed and price-insensitive load.
For instance, [6] models the electricity trading arrangements in
the United Kingdom. In this system, retailers supply inelastic
loads but may game on an intentional imbalance to maximize
their profit. Nowadays, retailers already have access to flexible
loads to optimize their costs. In this paper, we assume that
retailers have direct control over the flexible loads in their
portfolio. Control with real-time pricing is investigated in [7],
where retailers optimize the real-time pricing to minimize their
retailing and imbalance costs. The results show that a retailer
has an incentive to shift the demand using a time-dependent
price to reduce its imbalance. These models do not consider
the provision of secondary reserves by load aggregation.
In this paper, we make several assumptions concerning the
energy market and the reserve market. The methodology used
in this paper could be applied straightforwardly to alternative
hypotheses. First, we assume that both markets are day-ahead
markets. Second, we suppose that they are cleared sequentially.
Third, we assume that these markets are pool markets where
the market prices are the price for energy and the price for
flexibility. Our simulation is based on three main stages. In
the first stage, producers and retailers submit their bids to
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the energy market for each period of the next day. In the
second stage, bids are submitted to the reserve market. In a first
setting, we only allow producers to submit bids whereas in a
second setting, both producers and retailers are allowed to bid
in the secondary reserve market. Finally, the third stage gives
the imbalance fee that each actor pays or receives depending
on its position at the end of each market period compared to
the position announced one day ahead.
For the sake of simplicity, we consider only three types
of actors: retailers with flexible demand in their portfolio,
producers of energy, and the SO which has to buy in the retail
market well-defined amounts of flexibility. We make several
assumptions to model the behavior of the other actors. The
main one is that they optimize their positions using forecasts of
the prices of the energy and reserve markets, and the imbalance
tariffs. In the simulations described in this paper, we arbitrarily
suppose that they use a weighted average of the previous prices
to forecast prices.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II
focuses on the case where flexible loads can only be exploited
in the energy market. It defines the models that are used
by the actors, and presents simulation results that serve for
comparison with the results of the next section. Section III
proposes a reorganization of the system to allow retailers to
bid in the secondary reserve market, and computational results
are compared to the first setting. Section IV concludes.
II. MODEL OF THE CURRENT SYSTEM
This section presents the current organization of the system.
It details the mathematical problems that each stakeholder
solves to optimize its decisions. Stakeholders have three de-
cision stages, which are summarized here, and detailed in the
next subsections. One day ahead, the energy market, through
market operators, collects the offers of the participants (in our
case producers and retailers), computes a uniform price for
each period, and notifies the participants of the acceptance of
their offers. In a second stage, still one day ahead but after
the clearing of the energy market, producers can bid in the
secondary reserve market. After these two stages, producers
and retailers optimize their position according to an estimate
of the imbalance tariffs for the next day, and submit to the SO
the net power they will inject/withdraw from the network in
their balancing perimeter. The participants pay or receive an
imbalance fee depending on their position at the end of each
market period compared to the position they announced one
day ahead.
The main simplifications we make are the following. First,
we assume each type of actor makes decisions according to
the same mathematical model, but with its own data, and
solves these mathematical models to optimality. Second, we
use linear programming relaxations of the problems that are
actually solved by the stakeholders.
A. Energy market
The energy market model takes its inspiration from the
Central Western Europe coupled market [8]. Producers and
retailers submit offers to the market operator. An offer is
defined by a volume and a limit price, and can span only
one time period t ∈ {1, . . . , T}. The proportion of an offer
which is accepted is determined by the market clearing price
(MCP) computed by the market operator. The MCP is the
price at the intersection of the supply and the demand curves,
which depends on the period, and is denoted by piEt . Supply
offers are fully rejected (resp. accepted) when their limit price
is greater (resp. smaller) than the MCP, or partially accepted
when their limit price equals the MCP. The MCP is bounded
by picap.
For each period t, each actor forecasts the price of the
energy market pˆiEt . This forecast is obtained by the exponential
mean of the prices in the last T rounds. Note that if the price
cap picap is reached for a round in the history, the value is
replaced in the mean by the last non-capped one. However,
the information that the price cap was reached in a round is
directly integrated into the optimization model of the actors.
B. Reserve market
We assume that the SO has to procure a quantity of upward
and downward reserve for each period, respectively R+t and
R−t , determined as a fixed percentage of the total consumption
in period t. A bid in the reserve market consists of a maximum
power (positive for upward reserve, negative otherwise), and
an activation price. In case of activation, the SO pays the
activation price times the energy activated. Every bid covers
only one period and may be rejected, accepted partially, or
totally. The reservation of the capacity of a bid is remunerated
at a regulated capacity price piU for the upward reserve and
piL for the downward reserve.
C. Imbalance settlement
As our formulation is deterministic, the imbalance of an
actor can only be caused either by the technical impossibility
of satisfying the outcome of the markets, or by an intentional
imbalance. The purpose of this stage is to compute the tariff of
upward and downward imbalances, piI+t and pi
I−
t . This tariff
is the activation price of the most expensive activated bid. In
case of no imbalance, the imbalance tariff is set to 0. If the
imbalance is greater than the contracted reserve, we assume
that the SO may use non-contracted reserves to restore balance.
This reserve is supposed to be very expensive and drives the
imbalance tariff to the price cap pinc.
For each period t, every actor forecasts the imbalance tariffs
pˆiI
+
t and pˆi
I−
t . This forecast is obtained by the exponential
mean of the prices in the last T rounds. Note that if the
imbalance tariff is equal to either zero or pinc for an iteration
in the history, the value is replaced in the mean by the last one
which is not zero or pinc. The models of the actors explicitly
take into account these cases.
D. Retailer model
In this setting, a retailer estimates the consumption of its
clients and make bids at the upper cap price picap. We assume
that a proportion of the retailer’s load is flexible and that the
retailer has the power to decide when these loads will consume
power. The inelastic part of the demand of the retailer in period
t is denoted by νt. We assume that each flexible load i can
be accurately represented by a tank model, as in [9]. At each
period t, the load consumes power di,t bounded by (2). The
limits on the energy in the tank are given by (3). The state
transition is given by (4), where ηi is the efficiency, φi,t the
losses in one period, and ∆t the duration of a period. The total
energy consumed in the time horizon is bounded by (5). One
day ahead, the retailer optimizes the consumption to minimize
its retailing costs:
min
T∑
t=1
[pˆiEt Dt + (pi
cap − pˆiEt ) max{0, Dt −Dmaxt }
+ pˆiI+t I
+
t + (pi
nc − pˆiI+) max{0, I+t − I+maxt }
+ pˆiI−t I
−
t + (pi
nc − pˆiI−) max{0, I−t − I−maxt }] (1)
subject to, ∀i ∈M, t ∈ {1, ..., T},
dmini,t ≤ di,t,≤ dmaxi,t (2)
emini,t ≤ ei,t ≤ emaxi,t (3)
ei,t+1 = ei,t − φi,t + ηidi,t∆t (4)
∀i ∈M,
ξmini ≤
T∑
t=1
di,t∆t ≤ ξmaxi (5)
∀t ∈ {1, ..., T},
Dt − I+t + I−t = νt +
M∑
i=1
di,t. (6)
Equation (6) computes the total demand the retailer submits
to the energy market, Dt, and the upward (resp. downward)
imbalance, I+t (resp. I
−
t ) ≥ 0. From the history of the previous
rounds, the retailer learns a threshold demand Dmaxt above
which the clearing of the energy market yields the price cap
picap. If in a previous round piEt = pi
cap, then the retailer
sets its threshold demand slightly below the volume submitted,
e.g., Dmaxt = 0.95Dt. The same consideration is applied to
imbalance if the tariff of imbalance is either 0 or pinc.
After the clearing of the energy market, the retailer runs
again the previous optimization problem with Dt given as data
to optimize its position for the second and the third stages.
E. Producer model
The producer optimizes its position using price forecasts and
the characteristics of its production units. The output of the
following optimization problem is the power to be submitted
to the energy market Pt, the upward/downward reserve Ut/Lt,
and its upward/downward imbalance I+t /I
−
t .
max
T∑
t=1
[pˆiEt Pt − (picap + pˆiEt ) max{0, Pmint − Pt}
− pˆiI+t I+t − (pinc − pˆiI+) max{0, I+t − I+maxt }
− pˆiI−t I−t − (pinc − pˆiI−) max{0, I−t − I−maxt }
+ ηtUt + ηtLt −
∑
i
ci,tpi,t] (7)
subject to ∀t ∈ {1, ..., T} and each production unit i,
pi,t + ui,t ≤ pmaxi,t (8)
pmini,t ≤ pi,t − li,t (9)
(pi,t + ui,t)− pi,t−1 ≤ ρui (10)
pi,t−1 − (pi,t − li,t) ≤ ρdi (11)
ui,t, li,t ≥ 0 (12)
∀t ∈ {1, ..., T}:
Pt + I
+
t − I−t =
∑
i
pi,t (13)
Ut =
∑
i
ui,t (14)
Lt =
∑
i
li,t (15)
The power production of unit i is offered to the energy market
(pi,t) and the reserve market (ui,t as upward reserve, li,t as
downward reserve) at the price ci,t for every period t. The
predicted downward imbalance is submitted as a bid to the
energy market at the price pˆiI−.
In the second stage, Pt, the power cleared in the energy
market, is a parameter. At the third stage, the accepted
upward and downward reserve quantities are also fixed, but
the producer may still optimize its imbalance.
Similarly to the retailer model, the producer model uses the
data from the rounds where the price cap was reached to learn
what minimal quantity to submit to the energy market Pmint .
The same mechanism is used for the imbalance volume. The
objective function (7) uses a price  to balance the provision
of energy and reserve. If we set ηt = piU or piL, the previous
optimization problem assumes that all reserves proposed by
the producer will be accepted at the capacity price. To prevent
the production of the energy cleared in the energy market at
a higher price than the MCP, we put ηt = 0.005e/MWh,∀t.
Other options may be considered, such as taking the product
of the capacity prices and the probability of the reserve bid’s
being accepted.
F. Results
We simulate a benchmark system for one day, divided into
24 periods. This will be used for comparison with the proposal
of Section III. Producers own two types of units: (i) slow
ramping units with costs randomly generated between 45 and
60e/MWh and (ii) high ramping units with costs between
60 and 80e/MWh. For each period t, the SO contracts for
a quantity of upward and downward reserves (R+t and R
−
t )
equal to 2% of the total consumption cleared in MW in the
energy market. The capacity price for the reservation of a
reserve is set to 45e/MWh. The system evolves until the
energy prices and the forecasts converge individually and to
the same value, or a cycle is detected, i.e., actors start taking
the same set of positions over and over.
We present a typical run for a mean total consumption of
1000 MW with 6% of flexible loads. Fig. 1a shows for each
round a measure of the MCP forecasting error. The system
(a) Evolution of the forecasting error (e/MWh) for the energy prices
(‖pˆiE − piE‖∞) for a system with 6% of flexible consumption.
(b) Variability of the energy price (e/MWh) as a function of the
amount of flexible consumption.
(c) Mean total imbalance (MWh) as a function of the amount of flexible
consumption.
Fig. 1: Simulation of the current system.
cycles after 113 rounds, repeating rounds 77 to 112. The
following results are the mean over these 35 rounds. The mean
energy market price is 49.81e/MWh. The SO cost for reserve
procurement is 42683e. This reserve covers a total imbalance
of 190 MWh over the day and no non-contracted reserve needs
to be used. We observe that this imbalance is caused solely
by the producers.
We now compare the status of the system for a mean total
consumption of 1000 MW with 0% to 10% of flexible loads.
With our parameters, increasing the flexibility of the demand-
side left the mean energy market price and SO costs for reserve
procurement barely unchanged. The variability of the energy
price, defined here as the difference between the minimum and
maximum price, is given in Fig. 1b. Fig. 1c shows the mean
total imbalance of the system as a function of the amount of
flexible loads. Non-contracted reserve is not needed in any of
the cases considered.
III. OPENING THE RESERVE MARKET TO RETAILERS
We focus here on the provision of secondary reserves by
retailers using load flexibility. First, we introduce modulation
bids for the reserve market that are suitable to demand side
management. Sections III-B, III-C and III-D propose, respec-
tively, the required modifications to the models of the reserve
market, the imbalance settlement, and the retailer. Section III-E
presents the result of opening the reserve market to retailers.
A. Modulation bids for the reserve market
Unlike production units, the consumption of a load in a
period depends on the consumption in the previous periods.
Increasing the consumption in one period implies that the con-
sumption will decrease later on. This fact motivates the intro-
duction of bids more adapted to load behavior. A modulation
bid consists of a flexibility margin [Dt − F,Dt + F ] ∀t ∈ N
around a baseline consumption Dt over a set N of consecutive
market periods. F is the maximum amplitude of the power
modulation. The SO can specify the consumption of the
retailer for every period t ∈ N under the constraints that
these specifications do not violate the margin and that the
total energy consumed in the N periods is identical. The total
energy consumed must be constant in order to provide the
same utility to the load owners. For instance, a heat pump
turned off for an hour needs to consume more afterwards to
get the temperature back to its set point.
B. Clearing of the reserve market
The following optimization model considers the cost of
reservation as well as the cost of activation cEi of each bid.
The capacity price of modulation bids is regulated at piF . As
the SO has no knowledge of the future imbalance, it supposes
that it may activate all the contracted reserves. The objective
function (16) shows that the SO receives the activation cost of
downward reserve bids. To prevent this model from contract-
ing every downward reserve bid, we introduce an additional
modeling parameter cot that penalizes the amount of reserve
contracted over the requirements R+t and R
−
t in period t. Our
implementation uses cot = 1.1 maxi∈P−t c
E
i . The efficiency
factor ζ of a modulation bid expresses the fact that modulation
bids are not equivalent to classical bids.
1) Data:
R+t Quantity of upward reserve to contract for period t.
R−t Quantity of downward reserve to contract for period t.
P+t Set of classical upward bids for period t.
P−t Set of classical downward bids for period t.
F Set of modulation bids.
B Set of bids : B = F ∪Tt=1 (P+t ∪ P−t )
Qi Volume of bid i ∈ B.
cEi Cost of activation of bid i ∈ B.
Ni Set of periods covered by the modulation bid i ∈ F .
ζi Efficiency ratio of bid i ∈ B.
pinc Cost of activating non-contracted reserve.
2) Variables:
xi Determine if a bid i ∈ B is accepted totally (= 1),
partially (∈]0, 1[) or rejected (= 0).
s+t Over-contracted upward reserve: s
+
t ≥ 0.
s−t Over-contracted downward reserve: s
−
t ≥ 0.
n+t Non-contracted upward reserve: s
+
t ≥ 0.
n−t Non-contracted downward reserve: s
−
t ≥ 0.
3) Model:
min
T∑
t=1
[ ∑
i∈P+t
(piU + cEi )xiQi +
∑
i∈P−t
(piL − cEi )xiQi
+ cot (s
+
t + s
−
t ) + pi
nc(n+t + n
−
t )
]
+
∑
i∈F
(piF + cEi )xiQi
(16)
subject to ∀t ∈ {1, ..., T},∑
i∈P+t
Qixiζi +
∑
i∈F :t∈Ni
Qixiζi + n
+
t − s+t = R+t (17)∑
i∈P−t
Qixiζi +
∑
i∈F :t∈Ni
Qixiζi + n
−
t − s−t = R−t (18)
C. Imbalance settlement
The following model gives the optimal activation scheme a
SO would use to restore balance in every market period. We
assume the SO knows exactly what the imbalance It will be
for each period, given the nominations of the actors, i.e. their
positions on the day-ahead energy market.
1) Data:
It Imbalance in period t.
P+t Set of contracted upward reserve bids for period t.
P−t Set of contracted downward reserve bids for period t.
F Set of contracted modulation bids.
Qi Volume of bid i ∈ Bt, ∀t.
cEi Cost of usage of bid i ∈ B.
Ni Set of periods covered by the modulation bid i ∈ F .
pinc Cost of activating non-contracted reserve.
2) Variables:
xi Activation of a bid i ∈ P+t ∪ P−t , ∀t: xi ∈ [0, 1].
vi,t Activation upward of a modulation bid i ∈ F
in period t ∈ Ni: vi,t ∈ [0, 1].
wi,t Activation downward of a modulation bid i ∈ F
in period t ∈ Ni: wi,t ∈ [0, 1].
y+t Non-contracted upward reserve: y
+
t ≥ 0.
y−t Non-contracted downward reserve: y
−
t ≥ 0.
3) Model:
min
∑
i∈F
cEi Qi
∑
τ∈Ni
(vi,τ + wi,τ )
+
T∑
t=1
∑
i∈P+t
cEi xiQi +
∑
i∈P−t
(cot − cEi )xiQi + pinc(y+t + y−t )

(19)
subject to ∀t ∈ {1, ..., T},∑
i∈P+t
Qixi −
∑
i∈P−t
Qixi +
∑
i∈F :t∈Ni
Qi(vi,t − wi,t)
+ y+t − y−t + It = 0 (20)
∀i ∈ F , ∑
t∈Ni
(vi,t − wi,t) = 0 (21)
D. Retailer model to provide secondary reserve
The objective of the retailer is to maximize its profit from
the retailing activities and the flexibility services it sells to the
SO. We suppose that the retailer selects a set of modulation
bids R to submit to the reserve market, whose quantity is the
result of the following optimization problem. These bids are
supposed to be non-overlapping. Each bid k starts in period τk
and lasts Nk periods. For every modulation bid k, we define
the two most constraining scenarios for the provision of the
modulation range [Dt − Fk, Dt + Fk] ∀t ∈ Nk: D and D
(cf. Fig. 2) where the notation underline/overline indicates the
variables related to these scenarios. In the first one, D, the
SO asks for a modulation upwards for the N/2 first periods
and ensures an energy balance in the last two periods. In the
second one, D, the SO asks for modulation downwards for the
N/2 first periods. The two scenarios D and D may be used to
define the range of flexibility described previously. Section V
proves that scenarios D and D cover every activation scheme
that the SO may ask for from a retailer within the limits [Dt−
F,Dt+F ] ∀t ∈ N if loads are modeled by (26)–(28). The cost
of activation of the modulation bids of the retailer is considered
to be null, as the utility of the load is ensured by the integrality
constraint of the bid (21).
D
F
F
(a) D
D
F
F
(b) D
Fig. 2: Illustration of the two most constraining scenarios for
the provision of a modulation.
The optimization problem solved by the retailer is:
min
T∑
t=1
[pˆiEt Dt + (pi
cap − pˆiEt ) max{0, Dt + I−t −Dmaxt }
+ pˆiI+t I
+
t + (pi
nc − pˆiI+) max{0, I+t − I+maxt }
+ pˆiI−t I
−
t + (pi
nc − pˆiI−) max{0, I−t − I−maxt }
−
∑
k∈R
(
τk+N−1∑
t=τk
piFt
)
Fk] (22)
subject to ∀t ∈ {1, ..., T},
Dt − I+t + I−t = νt +
M∑
i=1
di,t (23)
Dt = νt +
M∑
i=1
di,t (24)
Dt = νt +
M∑
i=1
di,t (25)
∀i ∈M, t ∈ {1, ..., T},
dmini,t ≤ di,t, di,t, di,t ≤ dmaxi,t (26)
emini,t ≤ ei,t, ei,t, ei,t ≤ emaxi,t (27)
ei,t+1 = ei,t − φi,t + ηidi,t∆t (28)
∀i ∈M,
ξmini ≤
T∑
t=1
di,t∆t ≤ ξmaxi (29)
∀i ∈M, k ∈ R, t = τk,
ei,t+1 = ei,t − φi,t + ηidi,t∆t (30)
ei,t+1 = ei,t − φi,t + ηidi,t∆t (31)
∀i ∈M, k ∈ R, t ∈ {τk + 1, ..., τk +Nk − 2},
ei,t+1 = ei,t − φi,t + ηidi,t∆t (32)
ei,t+1 = ei,t − φi,t + ηidi,t∆t (33)
∀i ∈M, k ∈ R, t = τk +Nk − 1,
ei,t+1 = ei,t − φi,t + ηidi,t∆t (34)
ei,t+1 = ei,t − φi,t + ηidi,t∆t (35)
∀k ∈ R, t ∈ [τk, τk +Nk/2− 1],
Fk ≤ Dt − (Dt − I+t + I−t ) (36)
Fk ≤ (Dt − I+t + I−t )−Dt (37)
∀k ∈ R, t ∈ [τk +Nk/2, τk +Nk − 1],
Fk ≤ Dt − (Dt − I+t + I−t ) (38)
Fk ≤ (Dt − I+t + I−t )−Dt (39)
The energy of each load for the modulation scenario D,D
is given by (30) and (31) at the beginning of each bid period,
by (32) and (33) in the middle, and by (34) and (35) at the end.
The available volumes of modulation are given by (36)–(39).
E. Results
We now run the system with a reserve market open to
modulation bids. The reservation price of these bids is set
to 10e/MWh. Retailers submit a modulation bid for every
four hours. We use an efficiency factor of 0.5 to express the
fact that the quantity brought by modulation bids is worth
one-half that of the quantity from a classical reserve bid.
The results are reported for flexibility rates between 0 and
10%. Once again, the mean energy market price is left barely
(a) Total imbalance (MWh).
(b) SO reserve procurement cost (ke).
(c) Volume of non-contracted reserves (MWh) used.
Fig. 3: Impact of load aggregation included as modulation bids
in the reserve market, as a function of the flexibility rate.
unchanged, at around 49.81e/MWh. The price variability is
similar to that observed in Fig. 1b. The total imbalance, shown
in Fig. 3a, is slightly lower than in Fig. 1c. Fig. 3b shows that,
with flexibility, the SO reserve procurement costs decrease
significantly, to only 11% of the initial costs. Nevertheless,
the volume of non-contracted reserves that have to be used
is increasing in the flexibility rate, as shown by Fig. 3c. This
volume of non-contracted reserve is mostly due to the inability
of a modulation bid to sustain an imbalance of the same sign
for its whole time horizon.
IV. CONCLUSION
An agent-based model has been introduced to study the
introduction of load aggregation in the secondary reserve
market. In this model, each actor maximizes its profit based on
a forecast of the prices. Producers and retailers (which perform
load aggregation) optimize their positions in the energy and
reserve markets, and in the settlement of imbalances. We
propose to add a new product, the modulation bid, to the
reserve market, that takes into account the inter-dependency
between time periods due to load constraints. The results
show that introducing this product decreases drastically the
cost for reserve procurement. Unfortunately, modulation bids
are not efficient at covering an imbalance of the same sign
for multiple periods, which results in the activation of non-
contracted reserves. This can be avoided by contracting for
more reserves.
The proposed agent-based model could be modified to
assess variants of the market model studied in this paper.
One variant that would be worth exploring is to include
energy constrained bids in the day-ahead energy market [10].
One could also consider market-based capacity prices for the
reserve. They could decrease the cost of reserve procurement
but may, however, lead to gaming. Finally, an extension to
the provision of services to solve congestion or over-voltage
problems in the distribution network should be investigated.
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V. APPENDIX
We prove here that scenarios D and D cover every acti-
vation scheme within the limits [Dt − F,Dt + F ] ∀t ∈ N
for which the SO may ask if loads are modeled by (26)–(28).
For ease of exposition, we develop our argument on the set of
periods N = {1, ..., N}. We study the behavior of each load
individually and drop the load index for conciseness. Every
scenario * must satisfy energy balance:
?
e2 = e1 − φ1 + η
?
d1∆t (40)
?
et+1 = et − φt + η
?
dt∆t ∀t ∈ [2, N − 1] (41)
eN+1 = eN − φN + η
?
dN∆t. (42)
We use ′ to refer to a random scenario. d′ obeys the
constraints (40)–(42). If we use (41) and (40) in (42), we get
eN+1 = e1 −
N∑
t=1
φt + η∆t
N∑
t=1
?
dt (43)
which is true for every
?
d and in particular for
?
d = d and
?
d = d′. Therefore, we can identify this equality with the total
energy consumed in the bid period:
N∑
t=1
d′t =
N∑
t=1
dt (44)
We want to prove that every load scenario d′ : d′t ∈
[dt, dt] ∀t satisfying (40)–(42) is feasible if d, d and d are
feasible. If we use (41) and (40), we have
?
et+1 = e1 −
t∑
τ=1
φτ + η∆t
t∑
τ=1
?
dτ ∀t ∈ [2, N ]. (45)
As d and d are feasible and (44) holds, we have for the first
one-half of the bid period [1, N/2]:
dmint ≤ dt ≤ d′t ≤ dt ≤ dmaxt ∀t ∈ [1, N/2] (46)
and for the next half,
dmint ≤ dt ≤ d′t ≤ dt ≤ dmaxt ∀t ∈ [N/2 + 1, N ]. (47)
Employing (45) and (46) and using the fact that d and d are
feasible scenarios, we have
emint ≤ et ≤ e′t ≤ et ≤ emaxt ∀t ∈ [1, N/2] (48)
and similarly for the remaining periods,
emint ≤ et ≤ e′t ≤ et ≤ emaxt ∀t ∈ [N/2 + 1, N ]. (49)
Now we can see that every scenario ′ : D′t ∈ [Dt, Dt] which
satisfies (40)–(42) is feasible, by summing over the whole
portfolio of loads.
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